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THE WHISTLEBLOWER EXCEPTION TO THE AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ENFORCEMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
After centuries of neglect and disconcern, the nations of the world
have realized that the condition of the environment is of crucial eco-
nomic importance.' As the constraints of resource scarcity tighten
under the pressures of burgeoning worldwide demand, Pareto's ques-
tions of allocative efficiency move to the forefront of public concern.
2
The United States foresaw the hazards of environmental pollution and
Congress established agencies charged with protecting the environ-
ment. 3 Government agencies have controlled and enforced environ-
mental policy through various statutes including the Clean Air Act 4 and
the Clean Water Act. 5 Congress designed these well-intentioned laws to
protect and regulate society and they are often the only safeguard be-
tween the environment and harmful pollutants.6 But environmental
laws are most effective when enforced.7 Enforcement of environmental
measures is costly8 and difficult. 9 The high costs of detection and evi-
1. The main objective of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development (UNCED) preceding the Rio Summit conference
was to "devise ways to change human economic behavior so that the natural environment
of the planet is conserved." Preparatory Committee Narrows Options for "Agenda 21 "; United
Nations Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on the Environment and Development, 28 U.N.
MONTHLY CHRON., Dec. 1991, at 65. The committee reported that Group I proposed ac-
tion concerning forest and energy conservation, Group II proposed water utilization, and
Group III reviewed existing environmental laws. Id. Over 160 nations were expected to
attend the Rio Summit as signatories to proposed treaties. The Week Ahead: Rio DeJaneiro;
Helping Out Mother, Los ANGELES TIMES, June 2, 1992, World Report, at 1.
2. The resource efficiency theory developed by Vilfredo Pareto holds that scarce re-
sources should be utilized to the fullest possible capacity in applications which provide the
greatest return to society as a whole. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, Eco-
NOMiCS 487 (Patricia A. Mitchell, et al. eds., 1985).
3. Congress declared national environmental policy to "maintain environmental
quality" through coordination of "Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources". 42
U.S.C. § 4331 (1988). Pursuant to this end, Congress established "a Council on Environ-
mental Quality" with the passage of "The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969."
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 202, 83 Stat. 852, 854-
55 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1988)). President Nixon added to the Council on
Environmental Quality by creating the Environmental Protection Agency. Reorg. Plan No.
3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1343 (1988), and in 84
Stat. 2086 (1970).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
5. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
6. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642.
7. Economic analysis shows that effective deterrence of criminal acts and increased
care in avoiding civil wrongs is a function of swift and certain penalties. See generally, RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 517 (3d ed. 1986).
8. "The Federal government now spends more than $4 billion a year on the environ-
ment, a 12-fold increase in 20 years after adjusting for inflation." Allan H. Meltzer, Times
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dence gathering make whistleblowers extremely useful in enforcing pol-
icy.' 0 As a result, legislatures have granted whistleblower protection
from wrongful discharge under the public policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine." I
This Note focuses on the economics of the whistleblower exception
to the at-will employment doctrine and its function in environmental
matters. First, this Note discusses the background and development of
the at-will employment doctrine. Second, this Note examines pertinent
wrongful discharge and environmental whistleblower decisions. Finally,
Board of Economists / Allan H. Meltzer: Applying Market Principles to the Cause of Saving the Envi-
ronment, L. A. TIMES July 19, 1992, at D2.
9. Difficulty is often encountered because employees may be reluctant to pursue
wrongful discharge actions. See Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc. 361 U.S. 288, 292-93
(1960) (workers are often dissuaded from seeking redress for wrongful discharge); CHRIS-
TOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR,
213-16 (1975) (for a variety of reasons, employees often do not engage in whistleblowing).
10. "Seventy-five to eighty percent of the information on which the Inspectors Gen-
eral Act comes from so-called whistleblowers." 135 CONG. REC. H752 (daily ed. Mar. 21,
1989) (statement of Rep. Horton). In many cases, violations of statutes would never be
detected without whistleblower action. See Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292 (effective enforcement
of labor standards possible only if employees approached officials in the event of griev-
ances). Whistleblowers are crucial in environmental policy enforcement. United States v.
Goodner Bros. Aircraft, 966 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1992). In Goodner, discharges of phe-
nol and methylene chloride were discovered when "a neighbor noticed 'two men dumping
creamy beige, toxic-smelling waste into a ravine' on the Goodner Brothers Farm." Id. As
a result of the whistleblowing neighbor, the EPA and the Arkansas Department of Pollu-
tion Control and Ecology investigated, resulting in a cessation of the pollution on the
Goodner Brothers Farm. Id. Goodner Brothers Aircraft and Albert S. Goodner were con-
victed of criminal violations. Id. In the case of PICA Plating, detection of environmental
violations and the imposition of several million dollars in fines occurred only after a tip to
inspectors by an employee-whistleblower. Manik Roy, Pollution Prevention, Organizational
Culture, and Social Learning, 22 ENVTL. L. 189, 194 (1991); STONE, supra note 9, at 213-14
(discussing how B.F. Goodrich memoranda leaked by insiders prompted FBI investiga-
tions). Contra James W. Hubbell, Retaliatory Discharge and the Economics of Deterrence, 60 U.
COLO. L. REV. 91, 105 (1989) (arguing that statutory enforcement may be reduced because
.of false claims by whistleblowers which penalize innocent corporate behavior).
11. Federal whistleblower protection is granted to federal employees by the
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. Pub. L. No. 10 1-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (Supp. II 1990)). States granting statutory
public policy protection against wrongful discharge of state government employees in-
clude: Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-50.5-103 (1989); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29
§ 5115 (1991); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 4-15-10-4 (Burns 1990); Maryland, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 64A, § 12G (1988 & Supp. 1991); North Dakota, N.D. CE'r. CODE § 34-11.1-04,
-06 (1987); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (1986 & Supp. 1992); Washington,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4 2. 4 0.010y-.900 (West 1991).
Those granting statutory public policy protection against wrongful discharge to pri-
vate sector employees include: California, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 1989); Connect-
icut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51m (West 1987 & Supp. 1992); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 127, para. 63b1 19c.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 19A.19
(West 1989); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (1986 & Supp. 1991); Nebraska, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-1114 (1988); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1601 (1991); Oregon,
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659.035 (Butterworth 1989).
States granting protection under specific "whistleblower" acts include: Maine, ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-840 (West 1988); Michigan, MICH COMP. LAws ANN.
§§ 15.361-.369 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to -8
(West 1988); New York, N.Y. LAB. LAw § 740 (McKinney 1988).
For a discussion of various State whistleblower statutes, please refer to: Terry
Morehead Dworkin and Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They Working?, 25 Am.
Bus. L.J. 241 (1987).
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this Note exposes the shortcomings of the exception as currently ap-
plied and proposes a modest solution.
II. BACKGROUND
At common law, workers hired for an indefinite period of time are
considered employees at-will. 12 This nineteenth century doctrine al-
lowed absolute termination by either employer or employee for good
cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.' 3 Modernly, there developed sev-
eral exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine 14 including the pub-
lic policy exception. 15 Courts created the public policy exception to
protect the public from employers economically coercing illegal or im-
moral acts from employees. 16 Whistleblowing is one of the public policy
exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine.17 Whistleblowers face
enormous difficulties when bringing action. 18 Currently, costly disin-
centives exist which discourage whistleblowers from bringing valid
actions. 9
Public Policy Exception to the At- Will Employment Doctrine
To understand the whistleblower exception it is necessary to discuss
12. "[T]he rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is Primafacie a hiring at
will . . " H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272
(1877).
13. Id.; Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405 (1967); Hubbell, supra note
10, at 91; Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481, 481 (1976).
14. Nina G. Stillman, Workplace Claims: Wrongful Discharge, Public Policy Actions and Other
Common Law Torts, 398 PRAC. L. INST. 55 (1990).
15. Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)
(credited as the first case to recognize a public policy exception to the at-will employment
doctrine, Petermann was fired from an at-will position for refusing to commit perjury). Cf
Russell v. Courier Printing & Publishing Co., 95 P. 936, 938 (Colo. 1908) (allowing consid-
erations of public policy to void a contract).
16. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27; see also Jeffrey L. Harrison, The Price of the Public Policy
Modification of the Terminable-at-Will Rule, 34 LAB. L.J. 581, 584 (1983) (the public policy
exception is designed to protect the public, not the employer or the employee).
17. United States exrel Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 540-42 (1943) (explaining that
qui tam or informer actions have traditionally allowed recovery); Cummins v. EG & G
Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D. R.I. 1988) (cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge of employee dismissed for "whistleblowing" activity); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in
Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275-76 (W. Va. 1978) (cause of action pursuant to public policy
exception where employee discharged for reporting criminal violations).
18. Thomas M. Devine & Donald G. Aplin, Whistleblower Protection-The Gap Between the
Law and Reality, 31 How. L.J. 223 (1988) (describes the techniques used to dissuade
whistleblowing); Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. A False Hope for
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 355 (1991); cf. Roy, supra note 10 (examines group be-
havior and organizational culture and its effect on individual behavior which includes de-
terring whistleblowers).
19. STONE, supra note 9, at 215 ("[T]he drawback, however, is that while the law can
save the employee from being fired, it is a much harder matter to prevent the employer
from making his life uncomfortable."); Devine & Aplin, supra note 18; Fisher, supra note
18, at 356 (The credo of the whistleblower should be "No good deed shall go unpun-
ished."); Cheryl S. Massingale, At-will Employment: Going, Going..., 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 187,
200-01 (1990); Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns A Changing of the Guard, 67
NEB. L. REV. 7, 25 (1988).
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the at-will employment doctrine. The business climate of the latter half
of the nineteenth century was marked by economic hardship. 20 To pro-
tect against the common phenomenon of business failures, the political
and legal climate favored employer protection. 2 1 The employment at-
will doctrine attempted to promote, foster and protect freedom of enter-
prise and economic expansion.
2 2
The at-will employment doctrine first appeared in Horace Wood's
1877 TREATISE ON THE.LAw OF MASTER AND SERVANT. 2 3 According to
Wood's rule, employees in the United States hired for an indefinite pe-
riod of time were considered employees at-will, terminable at any time
for any reason. 24 .Despite its questionable origins,2 5 Wood's rule fit the
laissez faire economic climate of the day and quickly gained widespread
acceptance.2 6 The at-will employment doctrine was reinforced by mutu-
ality of duty and obligation allowing either employer or employee to
terminate at will, 2 7 which undoubtedly enhanced its survival. 28
The at-will employment doctrine left employees at liberty to quit
jobs easily, but without legal recourse for wrongful terminations.2 9 The
doctrine held the potential for abusive economic coercion in violation of
public policy and was eroded by Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters. 30 The Petermann court held that an employer's right to discharge
pursuant to the at-will employment doctrine was checked by considera-
tions of public policy.3 1 In time, other courts upheld a cause of action
20. John D. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employ-
ment At Will, 468 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 467 (1980).
21. Blackburn, supra note 20, at 467.
22. Id. at 467-69; Hubbell, supra note 10, at 94; J. Peter Shapiro & James F. Tune,
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974); see also Note, Protect-
ing Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1931, 1933 (1983) [hereinafter Public Policy].
23. WOOD, supra note 12, at 272.
24. Id. This differs from the common law of Britain where workers hired for an indefi-
nite period of time are considered to work from term to term with automatic renewal if the
term is exceeded. Summers, supra note 13, at 483-84.
25. Theodore St. Antoine, You're Fired! 10 HUM. RTs. Winter 1982, at 32-33;
The rule making employment arrangements of indefinite duration contracts at
will, terminable by either party at any time, is not one which has roots deep in the
English common law but one which sprang full-blown in 1877 from the busy and
perhaps careless pen of an American treatise writer.
Id. Hubbell, supra note 10, at 94; Shapiro & Tune, supra note 22, at 341 & n.54 (demon-
strating that the case law H.G. Wood cited in his treatise creating the at-will employment
doctrine did not support his final conclusions); Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1933.
26. WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS
AND REMEDIES 253 (1985); Charles A. Brake, Jr., Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will
- Have the Courts Forgotten the Employer? 35 VAND. L. REV. 201, 206-08 (1982); see also Public
Policy, supra note 22, at 1933.
27. Cloutier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1142 (N.H. 1981) (arguing
that the mutual obligations of contract theory were imposed on at-will employment); Sum-
mers, supra note 13, at 484-85; see also Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 515-20
(1884) (analyzing at-will employee dismissal in contract terms), overruled on other grounds,
179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915).
28. Blackburn, supra note 20, at 470; Blades, supra note 13, at 1419.
29. St. Antoine, supra note 25, at 35; Blades, supra note 13, at 1405.
30. Petermann v. Local 396, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959).
31. Id. at 27.
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for wrongful discharge pursuant to the public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine as safeguard for public policy.
32
Modernly, courts strike a balance between the competing interests
of employer discretion, employee security and public policy.3 3 Propo-
nents of the at-will employment doctrine argue that the employer's in-
terest in controlling the working environment must be maintained.
3 4
Proponents for enforcement of the at-will employment doctrine argue
that, except in the most egregious instances, allowing recourse for un-
just dismissal is unwarranted. These proponents contend unjust dismis-
sal protection encourages false claims,3 5 and is an inappropriate means
of enforcing public policy.3 6 Opponents contend that protection of the
employee and society is of paramount importance.3 7 If employees have
no recourse, employers will coerce them into committing illegal acts to
the detriment of society and, potentially, the environment.3 8 Heighten-
ing these concerns is the fact that neither union collective bargaining
agreements nor federal employee protection acts protect the vast major-
ity of employees in the United States.3 9 The public policy exception to
the at-will employment doctrine developed through the balancing of
32. Harrison, supra note 16, at 581; Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1931.
33. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981); Clou-
tier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (N.H. 1981); Martin Marietta Corp.
v. Lorenz; 823 P.2d 100, 105 (1992) (the majority argues that proper balance between the
interests of the public, employer and employee must be maintained). But see Martin Mari-
etta, 823 P.2d at 119 ((Erickson concurring in part and dissenting in part) arguing that the
purpose of the public policy exception is to benefit the public at large and not the individ-
ual employee).
34. Harrison, supra note 16; Hubbell, supra note 10.
35. Hubbell, supra note 10, 105. Opponents have been open in advocating limitation
of the whistleblower exception to the at-will employment doctrine: "Any general standard
for dealing with the discharged whistleblower, on the other hand, should protect him but
not affirmatively encourage others to whistleblow." Martin H. Malin, Protecting the
Whistleblowerfrom Retaliatory Discharge, 16J. L. REFORM 277, 302 (1983).
36. Malin, supra note 35, at 302 ("Relying on employee vigilantes (whistleblowers) is
not necessarily sound general law enforcement policy."); See Harrison, supra, note 16, at
584-85.
37. Theodore J. St. Antoine speculates that the harms to the individual worker and
society associated with job loss are severe:
Numerous studies document the increases in cardiovascular deaths, suicides,
mental breakdowns, alcoholism, ulcers, diabetes, spouse and child abuse, im-
paired social relationships, and various other diseases and abnormal conditions
that develop even in the wake of impersonal permanent layoffs resulting from
plant closures. It seems reasonable to presume that such effects are at least as
severe when a worker is singled out to be discharged for some alleged deficiency
or misconduct .... [Ilt is this piercing hurt to individuals which justifies the call
for reform of the at-will doctrine.
TheodoreJ. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower,
67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 67 (1988).
38. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981).
39. "Excluding [company executives and entertainers who have the power to bargain
for 'just cause' provisions, union employees covered by collective bargaining agreements,
and public employees covered by civil service statutes] the remaining nonunion private
sector exceeds 60% of the American work force and consists of over 65,000,000 employ-
ees. For them there has been no blanket protection from the 'at-will' doctrine." Paul H.
Tobias, Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The Plaintiff's Perspective, 67 NEB. L. REV.
178, 180 (1988).
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these concerns.
40
Two different approaches to the at-will employee wrongful dis-
charge claim have emerged. 4 1 One approach, based in contract, charges
employers with the duty to discharge in good faith arising out of the
implied contract formed by various aspects of company behavior.4 2 The
other approach, based in tort, allows recovery where a wrongful dis-
charge occurs in retaliation for exercising privileges, rights, or duties, or
for refusing to violate the law.
43
The majority of states now recognize a cause of action for wrongful
discharge pursuant to the public-policy exception to the at-will employ-
ment doctrine. 44 Although the term "public policy" has historically
been difficult to define, 4 5 many jurisdictions followed and expanded the
rationale of Petermann.4 6 Courts include the following discharges under
the public policy exception: (1) bad faith, 4 7 (2) refusal to participate in
criminal activity, 48 (3) retaliation for whistleblowing or invoking a public
40. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27 (holding that employer's right of discharge may be
checked by "considerations of public policy"); Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.,
421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Il1. 1981) (arguing for the need to maintain a proper balance be-
tween the employer's interest in earning a profit, the employee's interest in earning a
wage, and society's interest in public policy).
41. HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 26, at 261 (1985); Blades, supra note 13, at 1419-
27.
42. Smith v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 794 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo. 1992); Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.
364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974);
Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Brockmeyer v. Dun &
Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983); HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 26, at 261; Ar-
thur S. Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 630, 649-63
(1988); Stillman, supra note 14, at 55.
43. Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D. R.I. 1988);
Petermann, 344 P.2d 25, at 27; Sussman v. University of Colo. Health Sciences Ctr., 706
P.2d 443 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Lampe v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1978); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978) (employee wrongfully discharged for refusing to alter pollution control reports);
Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (nurse discharged by hospital
after testifying truthfully in an action for medical malpractice).
44. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 106 (Colo. 1992); see sources cited
supra note 11.
45. Stillman, supra note 14, at 55; see also Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27 (quoting WILLIAM
W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 546, at 675 (4th ed. 1856) ("[Public
policy] has never been defined by the courts, but has been left loose and free of definition,
in the same manner as fraud.") Story continues, determining that whatever is in contra-
vention of the established interest of the public good is against public policy); Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (11. 1981) (defining "public policy" as
"what is right and just and affects the citizens of the State collectively"); Public Policy, supra
note 22, at 1947.
46. 344 P.2d 25 (holding that, pursuant to concerns of public policy, an at-will em-
ployee had a cause of action for wrongful discharge resulting from failing to commit per-
jury); Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1932.
47. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 28 (applying Coats v. General Motors Corp., 39 P.2d 838,
841 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1934), which acknowledged the well-settled doctrine that the em-
ployer must discharge only in good faith).
48. Id. at 27; Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1978) (employee wrongfully discharged for not altering pollution control re-
ports); Sides v. Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (nurse threatened,
harassed, and ultimately discharged by Duke University hospital administrators after refus-
ing to commit perjury in an action for medical malpractice).
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duty49 or statutory right, 50 and (4) malice.5 1
The conceptual framework for wrongful discharge pursuant to the
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine differs im-
mensely across jurisdictions, but generally there must be a wrongful dis-
charge that violates public policy. 5 2 The most common elements giving
rise to a cause of action pursuant to the public policy exception to the at-
will employment doctrine include: (1) an act or refusal to act, (2) sup-
ported by public policy, (3) bearing a causal relationship, (4) to the dis-
charge.5 3 Discharges for any good reason or even no reason whatsoever
are not actionable; only wrongful discharges are actionable. 54 A wrong-
ful discharge standing alone or even coupled with a private interest does
not state a cause of action; rather, the wrongful discharge must impair
some public policy. 55 The Colorado Supreme Court recently required
that an employee must give the employer notice of the reasons for non-
compliance with the unlawful order in addition to the elements above.
56
To fully understand the public policy exception to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine, it is necessary to contemplate its policy goals. As the
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine is currently
interpreted, a wrongfully discharged employee brings suit against an
employer to enforce public policy. 57 Theoretically, the employee bears
the cost, the employer is deterred from future violations, and society
benefits from the action.58 This system of enforcing public policy has
been criticized for being unnecessarily regressive.59
The most recent statement of the public policy exceptions to the at-
will employment doctrine appeared in Martin Marietta v. Lorenz.60 The
49. Cummins v. EG & G Sealol, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 134, 138-39 (D. R.I. 1988) (cause of
action found for wrongful discharge of employee dismissed for "whistleblowing" activity);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va. 1978) (cause of action
allowed pursuant to public policy exception where employee was discharged for reporting
criminal violations).
50. See e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973) (to
prevent circumvention of the worker's compensation laws, an injured employee dis-
charged in retaliation for filing for worker's compensation benefits was recognized as hav-
ing a claim); Lathrop v. Entemann's Inc., 770 P.2d 1367, 1372-73 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)
(held that to allow retaliatory discharge for filing worker's compensation claims violated
public policy).
51. E.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (malicious discharge
for refusing to go out with the foreman).
52. HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 26, at 261; Blackburn, supra note 20, at 472; see also
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974); Thompson v. St. Regis
Paper Co. 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984) (holding that an employee has a claim where
discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy).
53. Elletta S. Callahan, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Rule Comes of
Age. A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 481, 490 (1991).
54. HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 26, at 261.
55. Id.; see also Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (allowing
action where public concern is involved but denying action where only a private interest is
involved); Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1949.
56. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992).
57. Harrison, supra note 16, at 584.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Martin, 823 P.2d at 107.
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Colorado Supreme Court held that a plaintiff employee must establish
that: (1) the employer directed the employee to perform an illegal act or
prevented the employee from exercising a public duty, (2) the em-
ployer's directive would violate a specific statute or clearly expressed
public policy, and (3) that termination resulted from the refused per-
formance.6 1 . In addition, the plaintiff employee must give the defend-
ant employer notice that refusal of performance is founded upon a
reasonable belief that the action would violate public policy. 6 2
The whistleblower public policy exception is a socially and econom-
ically valuable doctrine.6 3 Environmental policy is often enforced by the
State through agencies or by individuals in the community with standing
to sue.64 These individuals are limited to action either when the possi-
bility of future environmental damage is discovered or after environ-
mental damage has occurred. 65 The whistleblower exception to the at-
will employment doctrine is an additional means of enforcing environ-
mental policy. 66 Whistleblowers have exposed defense contractor
accounting improprieties, federal prison mismanagement, mismanage-
ment of Native American health care programs, numerous improprieties
in federal agencies, and questioned the United States' system of jus-
tice. 6 7 Whistleblowing employees possess the advantage of prevenient
action. 68 A whistleblower may proceed with a wrongful discharge claim
prospective of environmental damage. 69 A whistleblower's wrongful
discharge action derives from the firing itself.70 Firing may occur before
any environmental damage is suffered, or before the prospect of possi-
61. Id. at 109.
62. Id.
63. For a recent discussion supporting the public policy exceptions to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine and examining modem practical applications, see PAUL C. WElLER, Gov-
ERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT Law (1990); see also 135
CONG. REC. H752 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Horton).
"75 to 80 percent of the information on which the Inspectors General Act [sic]
comes from so-called whistleblowers. They testify time and again and most of the
information that [the inspectors] receive comes from these people .... Last fall
we were informed that $120 Billion has been saved in the last 10 years by the
inspectors general, so we are talking about big money here, and it is very impor-
tant to give these kinds of protections."
Id.
64. United States v. Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (envi-
ronmental pollution discovered by whistleblowing neighbors and enforced by state and
federal agencies); see Roy, supra note 10, at 194.
65. See e.g., Goodner, 966 F.2d at 383 (environmental damage suffered before
whistleblowing neighbors discovered the damage and reported).
66. Id. (EPA investigation, which led to conviction, instigated because of whistleblow-
ing neighbor); Hubbell, supra note 10, at 104-08; Cf. Fisher, supra note 18, at 357-58.
67. Fisher, supra note 18, at 357-58.
68. See Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114, 1116-17, (Ohio. 1986)
(employee discharged for reporting legal violations to his employer, but apparently no
specific violations of statutes or environmental damage had occurred at the time of dis-
charge as these facts were not alleged in the complaint).
69. See Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 485 N.E.2d 372 (I1. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1122 (1986) (employee discharged for refusing to violate federal regulations by mis-
handling radioactive cobalt 60).
70. The injury occurs from the discharge itself; the interest violated is the employee's
right to avoid wrongful, arbitrary loss of gainful employment. Clyde W. Summers, Labor
Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 15-16 (1988).
[Vol. 70:3
WHISTLEBLOWERS
ble environmental damage becomes publicly known. 7 1 Economic analy-
sis shows that environmental policy may be efficiently enforced through
whistleblower actions.
The labor market in the United States is criticized for unnecessarily
repressing worker's interests. 72 The labor market partially causes
worker repression. The United States functions with a "dual labor mar-
ket" 73 which consists of primary market and secondary market employ-
ees. 74 The primary market tends to have higher wages, better working
conditions, increased worker stability, more chance for advancement
and greater due process. 75 Secondary market employees have a far
lower rate of instigating wrongful discharge litigation.7 6 An examina-
tion of the case law shows that the vast majority of whistleblower envi-
ronmental litigation is pursued by primary market employees. 77
Secondary market employees, however, are far more likely to be ex-
posed to and have knowledge about environmental damage. 78 These
persons therefore are most in need of protection yet are most easily dis-
suaded from pursuing action.
79
III. DECISIONS
In practice, the public policy exception to the at-will employment
71. Contra, Goodner Bros. Aircraft, Inc., 966 F.2d 380 (authorities and neighbors una-
ware of pollution until thousands of gallons of toxic waste had been illegally dumped and
considerable environmental damage occurred).
72. See Charles A. Brake, Jr., Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will-Have the Courts For-
gotten the Employer? 35 VAND. L. REV. 201, 204 (1982); Summers, supra note 69, at 25; To-
bias, supra note 39, at 190; Note, Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1938.
73. Ryan C. Amacher and Richard J. Sweeney, On the Integration of Labor Markets: A
Definition and Test of the Radical-Segmentation Hypothesis, 2 J. LAB. RES. 25 (1981); Public Pol-
icy, supra note 22, 1938-42; Cf. Jerome E. Carlin & Jan Howard, Legal Representation and
Class Justice, 12 UCLA L. REV. 381 (1965) (discussing class theories ofjustice).
74. Carlin & Howard, supra, note 72, at 381; Note, Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1938-
39.
75. Note, Public Policy, supra note 22, at 138-39.
76. Tobias, supra note 39, at 190; Note Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1938-42.
77. Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (quality control
director discharged for assuring compliance with labeling law); Phung v. Waste Mgmt.,
Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986) (chief chemist discharged for reporting legal and ethi-
cal violations); Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 308 N.W.2d 459 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(company safety director wrongfully discharged for upholding health and safety regula-
tions); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978) (employee discharged for refusing to alter pollution control statements); Hartley v.
Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (Executive Director of
Utilities discharged for refusing to order work which would violate environmental regula-
tions). But cf. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (gas station
attendant brought wrongful dismissal action after discharge for refusing to violate air pol-
lution standards); Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (ship's
crewman discharged for refusing to violate posted bilge standards).
78. See 135 CONG. REC. H754 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep. Porter).
Mid- and low-level civil servants are the core of our Government. They are the
dedicated workers who really know how our system works best, and can see
clearly when abuses and fraud are taking place. They are in the best position to
help Congress and the executive branch ensure the proper functioning of our
Government."
Id.
79. St. Antoine, supra note 37, at 68.
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doctrine is applied inconsistently and on an ad hoc basis. 80 Courts across
the nation apply the whistleblower exception dis-similarly.8 1 An exami-
nation of several whistleblower decisions shows that aside from the com-
mon theme of limiting employee actions for wrongful discharge
somewhat, the only consistency in wrongful discharge actions is their
inconsistency.
A. Whistleblower Cases
Federal employees are granted protection under the Federal
Whistleblower's Act of 1989,82 but this statute does virtually nothing for
state or private employees. As a result, state and private sector employ-
ees proceed at the mercy of the state law in their jurisdictions.
85
Pacheco v. Raytheon 84 aided greatly in establishing this current lack of
consistency and private employee limitation to recovery. 85 In Pacheco, a
discharged defense contractor employee sought recovery in tort as a
federal whistleblower under federal statutes. 86 The district court ar-
gued that in order to determine the sufficiency of the action, the court
must ask: "[i]s the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the
statute was enacted?" 8 7 Using this rationale, recovery is denied to any
plaintiff not specifically listed in the class of those protected. Any private
sector or state employee not specifically listed as protected under the
statute is barred from recovery.
The Pacheco court denied tort recovery under the statute arguing
that even though the employee was granted statutory protection, em-
ployees are not afforded a private cause of action under federal
whistleblower statutes. 8 8 As a result of the denial of the private cause of
action, punitive and compensatory damages were not recoverable.
8 9
Disallowing these damages greatly reduces the value of the lawsuit to
the wrongfully discharged employee and greatly reduces the cost of the
lawsuit to the employer.
The Pacheco court also established locus of remedy as an element for
recovery: "is the cause of action one that is commonly left to state law to
remedy?". 90 Under that rationale, Pacheco allows, or requires, state rules
to govern whistleblower actions. 9 l  State rules governing the
whistleblower exception to the at-will employment doctrine are incon-
80. Patricia M. Leonard, Unjust Dismissal of Employees at Will: Are Disclaimers a Final Solu-
tion? 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 533, 543 (1987).
81. Summers, supra note 69, at 21.
82. Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (1989) (codified as amended 5 U.S.C.A. § 2302
(1992 Supp.)).
83. See Leonard, supra note 79, at 543-44.
84. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co. 777 F.Supp. 1089, 1090 (D.R.I. 1991).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1090.
87. Id. at 1091.
88. Id. at 1093.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1091.
91. Id. at 1093.
[Vol. 70:3
WHISTLEBLOWERS
sistent across the nation.9 2 The Pacheco decision further adds to this in-
consistency by incorporating the esoteric standards of the various states
into federal law.
The courts manipulated the interests protected to deny recovery. 93
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. ,94 the court denied recovery for an at-will
employee under the public policy exception. 9 5 In Foley, an employee
informed his employer that his immediate supervisor at the bank was the
focus of an embezzlement investigation at another bank,9 6 The em-
ployer told the employee not to believe rumors. 9 7 The employer trans-
ferred the employee from California to Massachusetts, with a pay cut,
prior to discharge. 98 The supervisor later pled guilty to felony embez-
zlement in federal court. 99 The employee brought an action for wrong-
ful discharge.' 0 0 The court determined that the employee was not
entitled to recovery as a whistleblower where the interest protected was
private, for the benefit of the employer, and not the public.' 0 ' The
court affirmed the award for contractual damages, but denied recovery
in tort.'
0 2
In Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, l03 the plaintiff brought suit in
wrongful discharge generally, but under the facts as alleged, could have
sought recovery as a whistleblower.' 0 4 The court established an addi-
tional evidentiary requirement to a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge: that the employee must present evidence showing that the
employer was, or should reasonably have been aware that, employee's
refusal to comply with the directive was based on employee's reasonable
belief that the action was illegal, contrary to a clearly expressed statutory
policy related to the employee's duty as a citizen, or violative of em-
ployee's legal right or privilege as a worker. 10 5 The court recognized
that this new element established an additional burden to the claim, but
argued the decision did not fundamentally change the nature of the ac-
tion or recovery.1
0 6
92. See supra note 11, and accompanying text.
93. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
94. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 375.
97. d.
98. Id. at 375-76.
99. d. at 375, n.1.
100. Id. at 373.
101. Id. at 380.
102. Id. at 401.
103. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
104. In Martin Marietta, Plaintiff was discharged from his supervisory position on the
Space Shuttle project after repeatedly reporting substandard workmanship, overstated
performance claims, misappropriation of materials, and budgeting discrepancies to Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration officials. Id. at 102-04.
105. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 109.
106. Id. at 110.
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B. Environmental Whistleblower Cases:
Application of the whistleblower exception is equally as varied
where environmental concerns are forwarded. In Trombetta v. Detroit, To-
ledo & Ironton Railroad Co.,°107 a non-union employee was denied recovery
after discharge for refusal to alter federal pollution control reports as
ordered.10 8 The court recognized the employee's cause of action for
wrongful discharge, 10 9 but denied recovery based on the trial court's
determination that plaintiff presented no issue of material fact. 1 10 The
court upheld the award of costs to the defendant." 'I
Following the at-will employment doctrine, courts deny recovery
where employees first reported violations to their employer. 112 In Phung
v. Waste Management, Inc.," 13 the court denied recovery where the em-
ployee reported illegal business practices to the employer."1 4 The Ohio
Supreme Court refused to back away from the strict compliance with the
at-will employment doctrine 115 except in instances of worker's compen-
sation, or discrimination claims.16
Some jurisdictions refuse to recognize any exception to the at-will
doctrine. Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc. "7 presented a situation where
an employee was discharged for refusing to violate state and federal re-
verse osmosis requirements.' 1 The employee sought compensatory
and punitive damages for wrongful discharge from his at-will employ-
ment position but the court refused to recognize such a claim under any
circumstances. 1 19 Other jurisdictions recognize the claim narrowly. In
Sabine Pilot Service Inc. v. Hauck,120 the court upheld a narrow exception
to the at-will employment doctrine where the employee had refused to
perform an illegal act. 12 1 In Sabine, the employee called the United
States Coast Guard which verified a posted prohibition of pumping bilge
into the harbor. 122 The employee refused to pump bilge and was dis-
charged. 12 3 The employer argued that the discharge was the result of
refusing to obey other directives. 124 The Texas Supreme Court held
,/
107. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R.R. Co., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 388.
110. Id. at 390.
111. Id.
112. Foley, 765 P.2d 373.
113. Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986).
114. Id.
115. "An at-will employee who is discharged for reporting to his employer that it is
conducting its business in violation of law does not have a cause of action against the
employer for wrongful discharge." Id. at 1117.
116. Id.
117. Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, 476 So.2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1330.
120. Sabine Pilot Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
121. Id. at 735.





that, while the narrow exception exists, "it is the plaintiff's burden to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his discharge was for no
reason other than his refusal to perform an illegal act."' 125 Otherjuris-
dictions place the burden on the employer, as in Phipps v. Clark Oil,126
where the court allowed recovery where the employee refused to violate
the Clean Air Act. '2 7 The court recognized a valid claim where a station
attendant refused to pump leaded gasoline into an tank reserved for un-
leaded gasoline, despite evidence that the employee was discharged for
refusing to serve a handicapped customer.
128
IV. ANALYSIS
The current ad hoc system, which favors unscrupulous private em-
ployers, effectively discourages whistleblowing. Whistleblowers are pre-
vented from acting for economic reasons because the additional costs of
bringing action preclude enforcement. 129 The current system ensures
that fewer employees will seek whistleblower protection under the pub-
lic policy exception before discharge, fewer employees will obtain re-
dress after wrongful discharge, and more violations of environmental
public policy will occur. Economic analysis of the whistleblower excep-
tion supports this contention.
Where the cost to the employee of whistleblowing is high and the
benefit is low, whistleblowing will be discouraged.130 Reflexively, where
the cost to the employer of whistleblower action is low, the benefit of
pollution and wrongful discharge is increased. 13 Examination of the
aforementioned decisions illustrates many of the economic realities of
the at-will employment doctrine.
A. Applications of State Standards
The Pacheco court applied state standards in some circumstances to
federal actions.1 3 2 As the cases taken together show, state standards are
extremely inconsistent. Inconsistency will reduce whistleblower action
because state decisions are varied and would-be whistleblowers will be
discouraged from acting. As an example, Phung 133 and Hartley 134 stand
against recovery and, subsequently, for strict compliance with at-will
employment doctrines, while Phipps 135 allows recovery. Whistleblowers
125. Id. at 735.
126. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 570.
129. Massingale, supra note 19, at 200-01; Summers, supra note 69, at 25; Tobias, supra
note 39, at 190.
130. See Posner, supra note 7, at 521 (discussing the effects of erroneous decisions on
deterrence generally).
131. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 404-05 (1973) (discussing the effects of exogenous error).
132. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 777 F. Supp. 1089 (D. R.I. 1991).
133. Phung v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 491 N.E.2d 1114 (Ohio 1986).
134. Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
135. Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
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are left with differences in recovery based not on their factual circum-
stance or behavior, but on differences of geographic location. It is a
fanciful stretch of reasoning to assume that environmental legislation
may be enforced to society's benefit through whistleblowing in one ju-
risdiction but not in another. Inconsistency discourages the employee
from pursuing recovery by raising the economic costs of action. It also
shields the employer from action by lowering the economic costs of de-
fense, and ensures that wrongful discharges will go unredressed.
B. Limitations to Employee Protection
Decisions which limit the protection provided to employees by
class, such as Pacheco 13 6 and Foley 137, create uncertainty as to which em-
ployees are protected from wrongful discharge. After the decisions
handed down in Phung and Hartley, the employee remains uncertain
whether their jurisdiction provides any protection for their position.
Uncertainty reduces the value to the employee of bringing a lawsuit, and
raises the potential cost if recovery is not allowed. Disincentives created
by uncertainty of protection insulate employers from discharge actions
and offer protection from damage awards.
C. Monetary Limitations to Recovery
Both the Pacheco 138 and Foley 139 decisions also deny a private cause
of action, allowing damages for breach of contract only. Limitations on
the potential award reduce the overall financial value of the lawsuit to
the employee. Reciprocally, this also reduces the cost of the lawsuit for
the employer. In Trombetta, 140 the court went farther by allowing the
defendant to recover costs. The risk of paying corporate legal fees will
discourage employees from bringing action, as most employees cannot
currently afford their own fees.
14 1
Lowering the award of the suit, as in Foley 142 and Pacheco,143 has the
same effect as exoneration since the firm avoids its liability. Exoneration
decreases the incentive to blow the whistle on wrongful action and
reduces the deterrent effect of the law. 144 Subsequently, enforcement
of public policy declines. Wrongful action increases as enforcement de-
creases because it becomes marginally more efficient to engage in
wrongful behavior.14 5 Corporations evaluate environmental damage as
136. 777 F. Supp. 1089.
137. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
138. 777 F. Supp. 1089.
139. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
140. Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton R. Co., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App.
1978).
141. Summers, supra note 69, at 25.
142. 765 P.2d 373.
143. 777 F. Supp. 1089.
144. "In the civil setting the effects of erroneous imposition of liability and erroneous
exoneration from liability are symmetrical: a reduction in the deterrent effect of the legal
rule in question." POSNER, supra note 7, at 521.
145. See POSNER, supra note 7.
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an externality, but often this evaluation is skewed by only considerations
of cost to the firm. 14 6 Only where the cost of the wrongful behavior is
raised will compliance with environmental statutes occur.
14 7
Because pollution externalities are difficult to quantify, 14 8 the full
societal cost of pollution is not taken into account. 149 Increasing the
award for whistleblowing increases compliance by insuring that suit will
be brought and damages will be high. Where damage awards are high
and certain, firms determine that the overall cost of illegal pollution is
too great to engage in, and compliance becomes the marginally cost ef-
fective solution.
For the secondary market employee bringing action, lowering the
likelihood and amount of award raises difficulty in finding legal coun-
sel. 150 Finding competent counsel has traditionally been difficult for
secondary market employees.' 5 ' Lower awards increase secondary mar-
ket employee difficulty in obtaining competent counsel. 152 Attorneys
representing secondary market employees tend to be the less competent
and least skilled members of the profession.15 3 Limiting awards to con-
tractual damages makes contingent fee arrangements available in tort
unrealistic.' 5 4 Giving the secondary employee inadequate counsel
moves the starting line back. Disallowing contingent fee damages slams
the courthouse door in the secondary market employee's face. 155 Most
insidious is that increasing the difficulty in employee action acts as a
preclusive disincentive which grants the employer a windfall allowing
violations to go unredressed.
D. Increasing the Cost of Pursuing Action
The practical functioning of the whistleblower exception acts as a
disincentive to enforcing policy because few employees obtain a finan-
cial position to fund the costs of the litigation process without employ-
146. PICA Plating, a firm of several hundred employees specializing in custom electro-
plating, is a good example of cost driven non-compliance. At PICA, it became cheaper to
illegally dump raw waste water containing cyanide, acid and heavy metals into area sewer
systems and risk the health and safety of workers than to upgrade the treatment facility to
adequate standards. Roy, supra note 10, at 193-94.
147. In the case of PICA, top corporate managers ignored pollution problems until a
whistleblower report prompted a surprise inspection. Only after the subsequent imposi-
tion of several million dollars of fines did compliance occur. Id.
148. Roy, supra note 10, at 207.
149. "Pica's managers, then compared the social cost of pollution not with the total
cost of pollution, but only with the risk borne by the employees working in unsafe condi-
tions." Id. Apparently, the workers evaluated the risk similarly: "After three or four
months of eighty hour weeks yotj don't [give a dam] about the environment." Id. at 194.
150. Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1942-43.
151. Id.; Carlin and Howard, supra note 72, at 381; Tobias, supra note 39, at 190.
152. Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1942-43; Carlin and Howard, supra note 72, at 428.
153. "Lawyers representing lower-class persons tend to be the least competent mem-
bers of the bar, and those least likely to employ a high level or wide range of technical
skills." Carlin and Howard, supra note 72, at 384.
154. Tobias, supra note 39, at 190.
155. Carlin and Howard, supra note 72, at 428.
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ment, 1 5 6 and often are precluded from recovery. 157  Wrongfully
discharged whistleblowers must fund the litigation process while sup-
porting themselves and their families without the benefit of a
paycheck. 158 Whistleblowers often have difficulty finding new employ-
ment. 159 Financial inability to sustain legal action for recovery is even
more prevalent among secondary market employees. 160
Both Martin Marietta and Sabine fundamentally change the nature of
a wrongful discharge action. Martin Marietta requires that employees
give employers notice that the refused performance is based on the rea-
sonable belief that the performance violates the public policy. Requir-
ing the evidentiary burden of notice in the prima facie case raises the
cost of whistleblowing by increasing the cost of bringing action. Notice
requirements also create "show down" style confrontations between low
level employees and management. Secondary market employees reluc-
tantly engage in these confrontations for a variety of reasons including
poor legal representation.161 Unscrupulous employers benefit from this
economic windfall, 16 2 with employees and society paying the eventual
cost. The notice requirement of Martin Marietta forces the secondary
market employee into a confrontation with the employer. Confronta-
tion deters the instigation of action, not based on legal considerations of
the validity of the claim, but by virtue of the unequal bargaining power
the employer wields. 163 Environmental damages increase as a result.
156. See Summers, supra note 69, at 25 (discussing discharged employees' lack of eco-
nomic bargaining power and inability to successfully obtain legal redress for wrongful
termination).
157. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 777 F. Supp. 1089 (D. R.I. 1991) (whistleblowing de-
fense contractor precluded from private cause of action); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,
765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (whistleblowing private sector employee denied recovery for
tortious discharge in contravention of public policy); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476
So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (at-will employee had no cause of action after refus-
ing to violate state and federal water pollution statutes and regulations).
158. Fisher, supra note 18, at 356 (explaining that would-be whistleblowers are de-
terred by the fear of losing gainful employment). Those who choose to blow the whistle
face enormous difficulties and are most often laid-off or fired. Id. at 366; Massingale, supra
note 19, at 200. See 135 CONG. REC. H752 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Sikorski) ("With the enactment of this landmark legislation, [The Whistleblower's Protec-
tion Act of 1989] employees can confidentially carry out their responsibilities without fear
of retribution, of ruined careers, lost jobs, and destroyed families, hopes and dreams.").
159. Leonard, supra note 42, at 678; Massingale, supra note 19, at 187; Tobias, supra
note 39, at 182.
160. Carlin and Howard, supra note 72, at 381; Hubbell, supra note 10, at 102; Leonard,
supra note 42, at 533 ("One result of this inconsistency is that professional and managerial
employees often prevail in wrongful discharge actions. Low-level, clerical employees sel-
dom prevail."(footnote omitted)); Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1942-43.
161. POSNER, supra note 7, at 524-25; Carlin and Howard, supra note 72; Public Policy,
supra note 22, at 1042-45.
162. Warren F. Schwartz and Gordon Tullock, The Costs of a Legal System, 4 J. LEGAL
STUrD. 75 (1975) (Examining cost as a function of sanction, where the sanction is low, the
cost of noncompliance is also low. Under these circumstances the incidence of compliance
will decrease as deterrence is eroded).
163. St. Antoine, supra note 37, at 68; "It is they, [employees] not the employer, who
most need protection." Id.; Leonard, supra note 42, at 678; Summers, supra note 69, at 16;




The burden of proof allocates to either the employer defendant or
the employee plaintiff. By requiring notice evidence in the prima facie
case, the Martin court decided that the plaintiff must bear the burden
and costs of persuasion. Had the Martin court allowed the employer to
offer as an affirmative defense evidence that the employee's belief was
unclear or unreasonable, the burden of persuasion would fall on the em-
ployer. Under this allocation, if the employee bringing action is. unable
to prove the new notice element, a directed verdict is in order. 164
The court argued that this additional requirement would not "alter
in a fundamental way the basic nature" of the action. 16 5 But, this shift in
the burden of persuasion changes the posture of the suit altering the
effect of the public policy exception.
First, by requiring that the employee bear the evidentiary burden,
the court implicitly raised the cost of bringing suit. 16 6 The plaintiff will
be required to assemble more evidence and log more attorney hours all
at an additional expense. Because of the inherently regressive nature of
some forms of at-will employment, 16 7 those discharged from at-will po-
sitions are the least capable of incurring additional legal costs. 168 Fur-
ther, because the awards in these cases are likely to be low and
undertaken on a contingent fee, employees bringing action will have dif-
ficulty finding competent representation. 16 9 The Martin evidentiary re-
quirement makes recovery for these actions more difficult and expensive
for wrongfully discharged employees.
While the employee may have difficulty proving notice in a suit for
wrongful discharge, the employer would have far less difficulty raising
the same issue as an affirmative defense. Corporations possess easy ac-
cess to the court system.' 7 0 Additionally, corporations tend to retain
capable counsel from the best institutions accustomed to wrongful dis-
charge cases. 17 1 Corporations are more likely to be able to afford
lengthy litigation and the elevated discovery expenses.1
7 2
The initial costs of bringing an action are born by the wrongfully
discharged employee who is likely the party least capable of bearing
these costs. Historically, courts reluctantly award punitive damages in
164. See COLO. R. Civ. P. 50; FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
165. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 110 (Colo. 1992).
166. See generally, POSNER, supra note 7.
167. Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1937-39 (shows that there exists in the United States
two labor markets, at-will employees tend to be either high level white collar employees or
menial white collar and blue collar employees from lower socioeconomic niches); Carlin
and Howard, supra note 72, 428.
168. Public Policy, supra note 22, at 1942.
169. Id. at 1942-43 n.84 (quotingJ.CARN,J. HOWARD & S. MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE
AND THE POOR 47-48 (1967) (arguing that the tort litigation system discriminates against
the poor); Id. at 1942 n.80 (citing Mayhew & Reiss, The Social Organization of Legal Contracts,
34 AM. Soc. REV. 309, 310 Table 1 (1969) (arguing that employees from the lower socio-
economic groups tend to be represented by attorneys from smaller firms who tend to be
less competent)); see also Carlin & Howard, supra note 72, at 384-85.
170. Id.
171. See generally Carlin & Howard, supra note 72.
172. Id.
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suits for wrongful discharge pursuant to the public policy exception and
awards remain low. 1 7 3 Any additional costs of commencing action re-
sults in the enforcement of fewer legitimate claims for wrongful dis-
charge. Whistleblowing will decrease commensurately.
With the Martin decision, the court further raised the cost of en-
forcement and added disincentives to bringing legal action by requiring
notice as a prima facie element. This new evidentiary standard functions
as an expensive disincentive, which raises the expense of litigation for
the employee to the benefit of the unscrupulous employer and the detri-
ment of society. As a result of the added costs, fewer wrongfully dis-
charged employees will seek redress and fewer will contend the issue as
a preventive measure before discharge occurs.
E. A Proposed Solution
Perhaps the solution lies in presumptively finding each employment
relationship checked by concerns of public policy unless otherwise ex-
pressly specified in the employment contract. 174 Finding all employ-
ment contracts checked by concerns of public policy would remove the
possibility of discharge occurring for improper reasons. Workers could
then whistleblow where justification exists with adequate job security.
Presumptive public policy concerns would bolster employment security
and would further protect the fragile, unprotected environment.
Critics seem to assume that the protections afforded to the em-
ployer by the at-will employment doctrine and the public policies
forewarded by whistleblower exceptions are mutually exclusive.1 75 Em-
ployees, employers and the public may all obtain protection and benefit
from at-will contract reformulation. With the presumption against at-
will employment from the outset, the court has a stronger basis for pro-
tecting public policy while leaving the parties free to write traditional at-
will employment discharge into the agreement. 17 6 Giving the court a
stronger basis for public protection allows the court to curtail grevious
abuses of the environment. Because the parties are left at liberty to
shape their relationship as they may through the contract formulation
process, they may negotiate job security and termination provisions. In
this process, none give away any fundamental right. All must actively
chart the course of the business relationship, and thereby express the
importance of the right in the contract. Through the negotiation pro-
cess, the true economic value of the right to discharge freely and the
importance of job security come to the forefront of the individual con-
173. Pacheco v. Raytheon Co., 777 F. Supp. 1089, 1090 (D. R.I. 1991).
174. Professor Arthur Leonard argues that eliminating the at-will doctrine at the outset
would increase company profitability, increase performance incentives and reduce litiga-
tion and litigation costs without denying the employer the right to discharge in good faith
for poor performance. Leonard, supra note 42, at 678.
175. Hubbell, supra note 10, at 105.
176. "It is neither unfair nor contrary to contemporary contract theory to eliminate the
employer's power to discharge arbitrarily without eliminating the employee's right to
leave." St. Antoine, supra note 37, at 68.
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tract. Traditional rights are molded to shape the preference of the par-
ties to the contract, neither is denied negotiating, or traditional at-will
employment doctrine provisions.
Presumption against at-will employment requires the parties to the
contract to negotiate any preferences to the contrary at the outset of the
employment relationship. As the doctrine is currently applied, at-will
employment is not bargained for, nor found as a conclusion or last re-
sort for interpretation, it is the last word concerning the employment
relationship. At-will employment in this way gives the employer a wind-
fall, creating expense for both the employee and society that would
otherwise be precontractually negotiated for. Precontractual negotia-
tion has the advantage of lowering overall costs by reducing litigation
and associated expenses. 17 7 By finding at-will employment relation-
ships only where the parties to the employment contract have expressed,
the legal system could avoid the ecomomic inefficiencies which plague
the status quo.
Considering the questionable origins of the at-will employment
doctrine, 178 and the inefficiencies created by strict compliance, the re-
formulated at-will employment concept should be a natural implementa-
tion for the legal system. Given the at-will employment doctrine's deep
entrenchment in current jurisprudence, the reformulated concept may
not gain widespread acceptance expediently.1
79
V. CONCLUSION
Reliance on the at-will employment doctrine continues despite its
dubious origins. The whistleblower exception is mired with uncertainty
and hobbled with expense. The costly disincentives associated with the
whistleblower exception in environmental litigation prevent valid ac-
tions. The limitation of damages grants unscrupulous employers a
windfall. As a result, environmental damage unnecessarily continues.
Perhaps the freedom of contract concerns raised by the proponents of
the at-will employment doctrine can be squared with the goals of the
public policy whistleblower exception. Until then, potential
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